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In the course of the 14th century the doctrine of Duns Scotus was
gradually gaining ever wider popularity at the universities of Europe.
To a large extent, this was due to the active role of the disciples of
Johannes Duns who were zealous advocates and proponents of the
teaching of their master. One of them was Antonius Andreae, a fran-
ciscan from Aragonia nicknamed Scotellus for the notorious fidelity to
the doctrine of his master and Doctor Dulcifluus for the reputable clar-
ity with which he had expounded it. It is small wonder, then, that the
name of Antonius can be frequently spotted in those passages of
other philosophers of the time, wherein they refer to, polemically or
not, to solutions or analyses characteristic for Scotus and his school.
The evidence of Antonius' popularity as a distinguished repre-
sentative of Scotism can be found as early as the second quarter of
the 14th century, i.e. already in his life time. One of the works which
testifies to it is the Quaestiones super Physicam by Theodoricus of Mag-
deburg, a little known Bolognese Averroist, who taught later in Er-
furt. The work, which was written before 1347, exists in three manu-
script copies in the libraries of Munich, Wroclaw and Krakow', the
main source for this paper being the Munich MS2. In several places in
the text of the Quaestiones contained in that manuscript, we can find a
handful of remarks concerning some Scotist solutions, some of them
naming the author of the quoted opinion; in two cases it is the name
1 MSS Munchen, Clm. 8405 - this MS is dated; Wroclaw, B.U. IV.F.9.; Krak6w,
B.J. 742 (an abbreviated version). For more detailed biographical and bibliographical
information concerning Theodoricus see Z. Kuksewicz, Einfiihrung, in: Tbeodoricus de
Magdeburg, Quaestiones super De substantia orbis, Wroclaw 1985, pp. XXV-XXVIII
and idem, Averroistic 14th Century Bolognese Texts in the MS El 742, «Mediaevalia Philo-
sophica Polonorum» XXIX (1988), pp. 9-48.
2 I would like to express my thanks to prof. Z. Kuksewicz, who has kindly provid-
ed me with his typescript of the Quaestiones.
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of Antonius, most probably: Antonius Andreae. By comparison, the
name of Scotus appears two or three times.
Admittedly, only two explicit remarks concerning the views of
Antonius Andreae in a work containing a few dozens questions is not
much, but since the name is mentioned not much less frequently than
those of other distinguished philosophers of the time, including Sco-
tus, the fragments pertaining to Theodoricus' discussion of Antonius'
opinions call for a scrutiny which should help assess to what degree,
if at all, the solutions of the latter influence the position of the for-
mer. To facilitate the task, I shall analyse the opinions of both against
the background of clearly Averroistic solutions given to the respective
problems by John of Jandun, one of the paragons of Latin Aver-
roism, n.b. quoted elsewhere by Theodoricus, too.
The remarks to Antonius Andreae in Theodoricus' Quaestiones
super Physicam appear in two questions from book I: «Utrum ens mo-
bile sit hie subiectum» (q. 1) and «Utrum potentia materiaedistingua-
tur ab eius essentia» (q. 18); in the first one Antonius' views are re-
ported in rationes principales alongside arguments taken from other
philosophers, namely Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome; in. the
other - Antonius is the only authority quoted in the question (besi-
des Aristotle and Averroes, of course), not in the rationes principales
but after the conclusiones which follow them.
In the first question Theodoricus presents the opinions of Anto-
nius in the following way. The subject of natural philosophy is natural
substance and naturality is the formalis ratio subiectiva of it, because
that which makes a science distinct - in this case: what distinguishes
physics from, say, metaphysics - is, by the same token, the means of
dividing it into its potential parts and because naturality is the princi-
ple of all considerations in science per se. Moreover, naturality is a
means of demonstration of various of attributes the subject and its
parts', The statement is followed by three arguments directed against
the opinion, presented earlier in the question and attributed to Tho-
mas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, which finds the formalis ratio subie-
ctiva of natural philosophy in mobility.
In the first place, what demonstrates something in a subject by
3 «Substantia naturalis sit subiectum, quia scientia distinguitur et denominatur ab
ipsa similiter dividitur ad divisionem eiusdem in suas partes potentiales. (...). Naturali-
tas sit formalis ratio subiectiva, quia ratione eius considerantur omnia 'in scientia per
se. Item, naturalitas est ratio demonstrandi in quorumlibet attributorum subiecto et
suis partibus». Theodoricus, Physica, f. lrb.
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means of something else - like mobility, which demonstrates by
means of the natural - cannot be a formalis ratio subiectiva. Accord-
ing to the author, mobility requires the mediation of the natural, be-
cause it is nature which is the principle of motion and quiescence. Se-
condly, mobility, which is relative, cannot be a formalis ratio subie-
ctiva, because the latter is intrinsic in the subject. Finally, what receiv-
es an object indifferently with its opposite, and mobility a such, is
not a formalis ratio subiectiva. Natural substance, on the other hand, is
sometimes mobile and sometimes quiescible, so it is received by them
indifferently.
Finding a source from which Theodoricus could have taken those
theses is not very difficult. There exists only one undoubtedly authen-
tic work of Antonius Andreae pertaining to natural philosophy: a
small treatise De tribus principiis naturae. Its initial question «Utrum
mobilitas sit formalis ratio subiectiva primi subiecti philosophiae na-
turalis», which was sometimes edited separately under the title Quae-
stio de subecto totius scientiae naturalis, discusses actually the same
issue as Theodoricus' «Utrum ens mobile sit hie subiectum»'. Most
of the theses referred to by Theodoricus can be identified as coming
from this question, although they can hardly be said to be direct quo-
tations; actually, they are short summaries of arguments given by An-
tonius, whose question is about twice as long.
First of all, Antonius rejects the Thomist opinion that ens mobile
is the subject of natural philosophy as false and irrational. His argu-
ments prove that the subject of physics can be neither an ens nor mo-
bile. It cannot be the former, because only metaphysics takes ens as its
subject, while other, «particular» sciences take for their subjects its
subjective parts, like quantity, substance etc'. It cannot be the latter
either, because mobility cannot be the formalis ratio subiectiva. This
argument, or - to be true - a series of arguments is directed against
both the Thomist and the Averroist positions. Two of the three argu-
ments cited by Theodoricus can be easily identified: Primo, naturality
is an immediate passion of a subject, whereas mobility is not, there-
fore, since a formalis ratio subiectiva must be an immediate passion of
4 This paper is based on a printed edition of De tribus principiis, Venetiis 1489, fols
1ra-4rb.
5 «Est (...) scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens in quantum ens, (...) aliarum
enim nulla intend it de ente in quantum ens. (...) Aliae autem scientiae particulares (...)
accipiunt pro subiecto aliquam partem subiectivam, puta quantitatem vel substantiam,
etc., ita quod nulla accipit pro subiecto ipsum ens». ibidem, f. 2ra.
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a subject, it is naturality which serves this function", Secundo, mobility
is relative and therefore it cannot be a fonnalis ratio subiectiva', The
third argument cited by Theodoricus has no direct counterpart in De
tribus principiis; though it is probable that Theodoricus could have de-
duced it from other arguments presented by Antonius there, it is also
possible that he took it from another work of Antonius, e.g. his ques-
tions to the Metaphysics, or - less likely - the dubious questions to
the Physics.
The resulting solutio propria pronounces that it is the natural
substance which is the subject of natural philosophy and naturality is
its formal ratio subiectiva. An important addition to the discussion of
the subject of natural philosophy, which is made by Antonius but dis-
regarded is Theodoricus' presentation of his views, is the statement
that naturality, which is the fonnalis ratio subiectiva, is identical with
quiddity',
Theodoricus' own solution criticises the one of Antonius agree-
ing with him at the same time He claims, namely, that Antonius is
right in maintaining that natural substance is the subject of natural
philosophy, yet he is wrong in denying that property to either ens mo-
bile or corpus mobile. His own position is that the three before men-
tioned concepts together with some other ones, as substantia sensibi-
lis, substantia mobilis, ens naturale, corpus naturale, etc., are all conver-
tible", More precisely, it is corpus which is a per se subject of all phy-
sics, and consequently it is corporeity which is precisely the fonnalis
ratio subiectandi. All the remaining concepts apply only denominati-
vely".
6 «Propria formalis ratio subiectiva est immediatius quam quaecum- quae passio~
demonstrabilis de ipso subiecto; sed mobilitas non immediate inheret prirno subiecto
philosophiae naturalis (...). Mobilitas videtur esse passio remota valde». ibidem, f. 3ra.
7 «Mobilitas est formaliter respectus, ergo non est formalis ratio primi subiecti
philosophiae naturalis». ibidem, f. 2rb.
8 «Naturalitas est formalis ratio subiectiva primi subiecti philosophiae naturalis.
Voco autem naturalitatem propriam ipsam quidditatem, seu formalitatem substantiae,
quae appropriat ipsam substantiam ut sit subiectum motus et aliarum passionum subie-
cti proprie naturalis et convertibiliter inhaerentium» ibidem, f. 3rb.
9 «Ista decem sunt idem convertibiliter: corpus, corpus' mobile, corpus sensibile,
corpus naturale, ens mobile, ens sensibile, ens naturale, substantia mobilis, substantia
sensibilis, substantia naturalis. Huius ratio, quia physica e loquendo unum non est plus
quam alterum» Theodoricus, op. cit., f. Ivb.
lO «Corpus est subiectum praecisive et per se in tota physica (...). Corporeitas est
formalis ratio subiecta vel subiectandi praecisive. (...) Posteriora sunt denominative
primi, puta corporis per se, quia mobilitas, sensibilitas, naturalitas adequantur corpori,
quia unum et idem per plures potest habere partes adaequatas». ibidem, f. Ivb,
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It can be noted, then, that the position of Theodoricus differs
considerably from that of an orthodox Averroist, e.g. John of Jandun.
The latter firmly upholds the opinion of Averroes (and Aristotle)
that it is corpus mobile which is the subject of natural philosophy,
stressing as much its corporeity as mobility. Moreover, he claims that
everything which is mobile is a body, defining the latter as a three di-
mensional substance". Therefore, he can concede ens mabile to be
the subject of natural philosophy inasmuch as it is understood as su-
bstantia mobilis",
In the other question, in which Theodoricus cites Antonius, the
problem discussed is not only whether the potency of matter is identi-
cal with its essence but also that of different aspects of that potency.
According to Theodoricus, Antonius solves the problem as follows.
Potency of matter is understood in a double way: either as a funda-
ment or as respectus, the latter being further divided into respectus ap-
titudinalis and respectus actualis". Of these three types of potency, the
first is not different from matter, either really or formally, the second
- is not different really but is different formally, the third - is diffe-
rent really from matter", The three types of potency refer to matter
considered in general, matter of the inseparabiles, and jnatter of the
separabiles, respectively. Regrettably, he does not explain the terms
separabilis and inseparabilis.
Again, as in the case of the first reference to Antonius, the most
likely source of the citation seems to be De tribus principiis. And in-
deed, one of its questions «Utrum privatio quae est tertium principium
in natura sit idem realiter quod potentia materiae» provides ample
material concerning the subject in question. The division of the po-
tency of matter presented before by Theodoricus is almost a quota-
tion from the solutio propria of Antonius' question with a slight termi-
11 «Alio modo accipitur corpus pro substantia subiecta trine dimensioni et hoc
modo intelligitur cum dicitur corpus mobile esset subiectum in scientia naturali». Jo-
hannes de Janduno, Quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum, Venetiis 1544,f. 2vb.
12 «Ideo cum dieo ens mobile oportet per ipsum intelligi substantia mobilis; ut sit
idem dicere ens mobile et substantia mobilis». Ibidem, f. 3ra.
13 «Potentia capitur dupliciter: uno modo pro fundamento, alio modo pro respe-
ctu; et hoc dupliciter: uno modo pro respectu aptitudinali, alio modo pro respectu
actuali». Theodoricus, op. cit., f. 13vb.
14 «Potentia materiae accepta pro fundamento non distinguitur a materia. Et
probatur (...), quia idem realiter pon distinguitur a se ipso. (...). Potentia accepta pro
respectu aptitudinali non distinguitur realiter a materia (...) [sed] distinguitur a materia
aliquo modo, idest formali modo. (...) Potentia accepta pro respectu actuali distingui-
tur real iter a materia». Ibidem, f. 13vb.
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nological difference: in De tribus principiis Antonius speaks of respe-
ctus abiciens formam alternately with respectus aptitudinalis and uses
the term respectus coniunctus actui interchangeably with respectus
actualis",
The presentation of the relations between the potencies in ques-
tion and matter contained in De tribus principiis also seems to have
formed the immediate source of Theodoricus' citation, since all the
theses reported by him have their direct counterparts in Antonius;
moreover, the obscure remark about separabiles and inseparabiles
finds its explanation there, too. The actual potency is called separabi-
lis, because it refers to an act, i.e. a form, which is something separab-
le from matter, hence it must be really different from matter; the
aptitudinal potency, on the other hand, refers to matter as apt to re-
ceive a form and therefore is inseparable from it really but only for-
mally".
As it has been said before, the presentation of Antonius' views
concerning the problem of the potency of matter occupies a special
place in Theodoricus' question devoted to the issue. Not only it is not
just one of rationes principales, from which it is separated by the
expression of authority of Averroes and the resulting conclusions, but
also is not explicitly polemicised with. Theodoricus remarks only that
it differs from the intentions of Aristotle and Averroes, similarly to
the ones cited in rationes principales, and that all of them are false in
accepting an accident truly superadded in simplicibus in the same way
as in compositis, which does not really seem to be an argument direc-
ted against Antonius.
Theodoricus' own solution, which follows after a number of dis-
tinctions, is offering another division of the potencies of matter.
First of all, there is the potency of the prime matter, which is not dif-
15 «Materia est essentialiter potentia; potentia autem potest sumi dupliciter, scili-
cet pro respectu vel pro fundamento, quod est ipsa substantia materiae. Iste etiam re-
spectus potest sumi dupliciter: vel ut est coniunctus actui, idest formae ad quam est,
vel ut est abiciens formam» Antonius Andreae, op. cit., f. 22va.
16 «Potentia materiae accepta pro respectu aptitudinali distinguitur a materia ali-
quo modo ex natura rei, scilicet formaliter, hanc ostendo sic: (...) quod non est idem
alteri in primo modo dicendi per se, distinguitur formaliter ab eo. (...) Sed potentia
materiae sic accepta est huiusmodi respectu materiae. (...) Potentia materiae accepta
pro respectu actuali distinguitur realiter a materia. Hanc ostendo sic: Quicquid ab alio
potest realiter separari ab eo realiter distinguitur. Sed potentia materiae sic accepta
potest a- materia realiter separari, (...) quia omnis respectus est realiter separabilis
cuius terminus est realiter separabilis. Forma autem, quae est terminus talis respectus
realiter est separabilis a materia». Ibidem, f. 23rb.
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ferent from it really directly, i.e. as two different things, but is differ-
ent from it really indirectly, i.e. formally; the latter term is under-
stood by Theodoricus as a difference between a thing and its mode,
or between two modes of a thing. Theodoricus stresses that in prime
matter potency is its essential mode, inherent to it, and that there is
no other potency in it, since it is simple. As far as second matter is
concerned, Theodoricus allows plurality of potencies here, as it is a
composite; he characterizes them as different from the essence of
matter really directly, because they are accidents superadded to it'".
Juxtaposing Theodoricus' concept of the potency of matter with
that of John of Jandun shows some differences between them. John's
division of potencies is fairy similar to that of Antonius: he divides it
first into subiectum potens, corresponding to Antonius' fundamentum,
and a formal principle which is a respectus, further subdivided into the
one referring to the agent, i.e. form, and the one referring matter's
aptitude to receive a form. In the first instance the potency is essen-
tially identical with matter, in the remaining two - it is not". It
seems that Theodoricus takes from John only the radical twofold di-
vision of potency but applies to a problem formulated in a different
way. Yet, it is visible that this shift of subject cannot be attributed to
the influence of Antonius.
The above analysis of the references to Antonius Andreae in the
Quaestiones super Physicam by Theodoricus of Magdeburg allows for a
number of conclusions. In the first place, the citations from Anto-
nius, few as they appear, are analysed by him very scrupulously and in
a friendly or even favourable way. Although he never accepts Anto-
nius' positions totally, he nevertheless modifies the Averroist stand,
17 «Potentia materiae primae non differt ab essentia eius realiter et directe. (...)
Haec potentia differt ab eius essentia real iter et indirecte. (...) Potentia materiae se-
cundae differt ab eius essentia realiter et directe. (...) Probatur [quia] accidens verum
superaddens differt realiter a subiecto directe, sed potentia materiae secundae est ac-
cidens superaddens ipsi, ergo etc.». Theodoricus, op. cit. f.14rb.
18 «Potentiam nos possumus intelligere duo: uno modo - subiectum potens, alio
modo - formale principium, scilicet respectum seu habitudinem ad formam generan-
dam vel ad agens. (...) Potentia, si sumatur pro subiecto potente, est idem essentialiter
cum materia. (...) Si sumatur potentia pro formali principio quo materia dicitur potens
- et sic non est idem substantial iter vel essentialiter cum substantia materiae».
«Potentia materiae, quod est eius accidens potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo
quantum ad privationem formae ad quam est potentia, (...) alio modo (...) - quantum
ad aptitudinem materiae ad recipiendum formam ipsam». Johannes de Janduno, op.
cit. f. 21vab.
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either by accepting certain Scotist elements, or moving the whole so-
lution towards a more conciliatory option.
In the first question we could see an instance of modification of
the latter kind. In stressing the role of corpus and corporeity at the
same time downplaying the role of mobility, Theodoricus not only
abandons a clearly Averroistic position but also moves towards the
view considering natural substance to be the subject of physics. His
acceptance of so many definitions of the subject of natural philosophy
as equivalent may seem to anticipate the philosophical eclecticism,
which was to come towards the end of the century, however, it is
worth noting, that his own solution of the issue is highly original.
In the other question, the possible influence by Antonius' opi-
nions is more difficult to trace, as its main attraction is the unique-
ness of the solution. It is interesting to observe that Theodoricus'
commitment to the physical way of explanation is more consistent
than that of either Antonius or John of Jandun. Whereas both of them
analyse the problem of potency of nature in ontological terms, follo-
wing the example of Averroes, Theodoricus only notes the triple, or -
more precisely - twice double division in the exposition of the au-
thority but he makes no use of it further on, since it refers to matter
per se. However, some influence of Antonius, or Scotism in general,
can be seen in his use of the term «formal difference», applied in the
considerations of prime matter.
It seems, therefore, that we are justified in saying that Theodori-
cus' peep onto the doctrine of Scotism, as presented by Antonius An-
dreae was long and careful enough to be called a gaze, too.
Indice generale
IGNACIO MIRALBELL, La distincion entre metafisica, matemdtica y fisica segun
Duns Escoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
EDWARD P. MAHONEY, Duns Scorns and Medieval Discussions of Metaphysical
Hierarchy: the Background of Scotus', «Essential Order» in Henry of Ghent,
Godfrey of Fontaines and lames ofViterbo 359
GIORGIO PINI, Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonius Andreas' «Expositio» and
«Quaestiones» on the Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
TIMOTHY B. NOONE, Scotus' Critique of the Thomistic Theory of Individuation
and the Dating of the «Quaestiones in Libros Metaphysicorum»; VII q. 13. 391
Jos DECORTE, «Modus» or «res»: Scotus' Criticism of Henry of Ghent's Concep-
tion of the Reality of a Real Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
NICO DEN BOK, Scotus' Theory of Contingency from a (post) Modern Perspective:
Some Important Developments of the Notion of Contingency after Duns Scotus 431
EEF DEKKER, The Reception of Scotus' Theory of Contingency in Molina and
Sudre: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
ANTONIE Vos JACZN, The Theoretical Centre and Structure of Scotus' «Lectura»:
Philosophy in a New Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
ODILE GERAULT, La notion d'intuition et l'apprehension du contingent .... 475
ALEXANDER SOLLINGER, Erkenntnistheoretische lmplikationen der Memoria-
Konzeption von Scotus 483
Ivo TONNA, La conoscenza umana in Duns Scoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
VLADIMTR RICHTER, «Univocatio - Vestigium - Imago»: zu Scotus' theologischer
Erkenntnislehre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
GIOV ANN! PIZZO,· Natura e funzione della memoria: il percorso scotiano tra
Agostino e Aristotele 525




HENRI VELDHUIS, Duns Scorns' Theory of Synchronic Contingency in «Lectura»
I 39 and its Theological Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
ANTOINE COTE, La critique scotiste du concept d'infini che: Thomas d'Aquin. 577
ROBERTO ZAVALLONI, Ragione e fede in Duns Scoto nel contesto del pensiero
medievale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
DANTELECRIVELLI, La teologia come scienzapraticanel prologo dell' «Ordinatio»
di Duns Scoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 611
GUlDO ALLINEY, La contingenza della fruizione beatifica nello sviluppo del
pensiero di Duns Scoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633
JAVIER ANDONEGUI, «Miscuit enim sectam suam»: Escoto entre Avicena y Aver-
roes 661
MARCO NINC!, Il concetto di esse re e la teologia negativa: Duns Scoto ed Enrico
di Gand difronte allo Ps-Dionigi 681
CHRISTIAN TROITMANN, Vision beatifique et science theologique. Interferences
scotistes dans le «Quodlibet» parisien de Guiral Ot tdecembre 1333) 739
Osv ALDO ROSSI, Duns Scoto lettore di Sant'Anselmo. A proposito dell' argomento
ontologico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 749
Indice generale
CELINA A. LERTORA MENDOZA, Escoto y el hilemorfismo aristotelico: Cuestiones
metodol6gicas . . . .. 765
JOSEP MANUEL UDINA f COBO, Duns Escoto y el argumento anselmiano . . . . 783
RICARDO OSCAR DIEZ, Una hermeneutica interpretaci6n escotista acerca del
argumento unico de san Anselmo en el «De primo rerum omnium principio» 807
Term Sezione
PSICOLOGIA, ETICA E SPIRITUALITA.
MARY ELISABETH INGHAM, Duns Scotus' Moral Reasoning and the Artistic
Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS, Duns Scotus on the Will as Rational Power. . . 839
AGUSTI BOADAS-LLAvAT, «lntellectus agens»: Bacon, Buenaventura, Escoto 855
MARINO DAMIATA, Duns Scoto davanti a G. d'Ockham 873
BERNARDINO DE ARMELLADA, Antropolog£a escotista del «status iste» (;,Frente
a otras situaciones posibles?) 927
ABELARDO LOBATO, El cuerpo humano en Duns Escoto y Tomas de Aquino . . 951
GIOv ANNI LAURIOLA, Il concetto di persona in Duns Scoto come scelta ermeneu-
tica 967
ROBERTO LAMBERTINI, Il «De perfectione statuum» attribuito a Duns Scoto e la
difesa dell'identita francescana. Osservazioni e problemi . . . . . . . . . . 985
RAQUEL FISCHER DE DIEZ, La piedad del pensar: Lenguaje orante en Duns Escoto 1011
EDUARDO BRIANCESCO, En torno del himno medieval «Jesu, dulcis memoria»:
Entre el argumento anselmiano y las metafisicas francis-canas del infinito 1023
Quarta Sezione
SCOTISMO E CONFRONTI
MARCO ROSSINI, «Quod coexsistit exsistit»: Alessandro di Alessandria e ifuturi
contingenti 1049
MAREK GENSLER, A Peep or a Gaze? References to Antonius Andreae in «Quae-
stiones super Physicam» by Theodoricus of Magdeburg 1065
ROMAN M. OLEJNIK, Attualita delle leggi logiche in Giovanni Duns Scoto . .. 1073
CORNELIO DEL ZOTIO, La «Via Scoti» nell'Epistolario di Johann Amerbach
(1443-1513): Approfondimenti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1091
HEINZ-MEINOLF STAMM, Johannes Duns Scotus in der Sicht Martin Luthers 1109
GIULIO BASETII-SANI, Il teologo scotista P. Deodat-Marie de Basly (1862-1937) 1117
DANIELA VERDUCCI, Scheler-Duns Scoto: Volontarismo e interpretarione del
moderno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
WILHELM KOLMEL, Heidegger und Duns Scotus 1145
DIEGO CICCARELLI, La circolazione di opere scotistiche in Sicilia 1157
FRANCISCO CHA vERO BLANCO, Sobre el Escotismo en la Provincia Betica. El
ocaso de una tradici6n 1171
Indice dei nomi . . . . . . 1199
